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1 Introduction
When we evaluate outcomes morally, there are many features of those outcomes on which our
evaluation might depend. One such feature, and a controversial one at that, is the time at which
each valuable event occurs.
Several moral views say that this time matters. One view, common among economists, is
that value must be discounted purely by its remoteness in time from the agent - an outcome is
at least as good as another if and only if its sum of time-discounted value is at least as great
(Arrow 1999; Dasgupta 2008). Under such views, it is better for valuable events to occur sooner
than to occur later; the sooner they occur, the less their value is discounted.
Another view is that it is better for an outcome to have a more equal distribution of value
over time (see Temkin 2015). Suppose an outcome brings long periods of time devoid of any
moral value. On Temkin’s view, this outcome will be worse than another outcome which has a
more consistent level of value over time, even if both outcomes have the same total sum of value,
the same total population, the same distribution of value over people, and so on.
But these views rely on an impoverished understanding of time. For a century now, we
have known that time is relative. The duration observed between one event and another varies
with the velocity of whoever does the observing (Cohn 1904). So too, whether two events are
simultaneous or not depends on that velocity (Einstein 1905; see also Comstock 1910). Simply
speed up and the set of events that are happening ‘now’ will shift; it will include events that a
slower observer would claim lie in the distant past or distant future. And that isn’t to say that
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fast-moving observers are wrong - we have no good reason to accept one observer’s perspective as
more valid than another, since we have no scientific experiment which distinguishes one constant
velocity over any other as ‘at rest’. There simply is no absolute perspective - no absolute time
- by which we can measure the duration between any two events, nor by which we can judge
which events are simultaneous.
This richer understanding of time brings ruinous problems for moral views which rely on
absolute time, including both of those above. Depending on their velocity, observers will disagree
over how far in the future events occur. So, if we must discount future value, they will disagree
on how much the value of those events must be discounted (Cowen 2007: 10). Likewise, they
will disagree over how equally distributed moral value is over time. (See Section 4 for examples
of cases in which this occurs.) But moral evaluations of outcomes must be absolute. When
evaluating outcomes - rather than judging acts, where agent-relative considerations might be
relevant - we are interested only in goodness simpliciter. And when evaluating outcomes based
on their goodness simpliciter, we usually think that there can be only one correct evaluation for
any pair of outcomes.1 But we cannot obtain a unique evaluation from those views above, at
least not in an extremely arbitrary manner - there simply is no absolute perspective from which
observers can determine the correct way to discount value or the distribution of value over time,
so there can be no absolute evaluation of outcomes.
This problem seems fatal for moral theories which encounter it. Buthere appears to be a
simple solution: just abolish from your theory any sensitivity to the positions of events in time.
Do not discount value by its remoteness in time, nor give consideration to the distribution of
value over time. When comparing outcomes morally, be impartial with respect to the times at
which valuable events occur.
One class of moral theories which appear to be impartial in this way is what I will call
aggregative theories. An aggregative theory is one that says that an outcome is at least as good
as another if and only if it contains at least as great a total aggregate of value, impartially
construed.2 Such aggregative theories include classical utilitarianism, as well as many other
normative theories which recognise that we have at least a pro tanto reason to promote moral
value.
1The problem raised above might be overcome if we simply allow that evaluations are relative to the per-
spectives of individual agents. This is rather more extreme than agent-relativity as it usually appears in ethical
theory: for one, it would extend into evaluations of outcomes rather than just deontic considerations; and, for
two, it would allow judgements to be relative to the agent’s velocity, which seems absurd.
2This aggregate may simply be the total sum of all instances of value, where the value of each instance is
represented on a cardinal (or ratio, or translation) scale. But it may instead be some other mathematical object
which represents some combination of the values of all individual events. For example, the method described in
Section 3 can be interpreted as representing the total value of the world as a set of functions.
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But, surprisingly, even aggregative theories encounter problems due to the relativity of time.
This is because their judgements must implicitly depend on the times at which valuable events
occur, at least if those judgements are to be plausible. This claim is surprising, but has received
compelling defences in a spate of recent literature (specifically, Wilkinson 2020; n.d.; Jonsson &
Peterson 2020).
The argument that all (plausible) aggregative theories must be time-sensitive goes like this.
Thanks to modern cosmology, we can be confident that our physical universe will be infinite; it
will contain infinitely many morally valuable lives, no matter what actions are taken by agents
like us.3 As well, over the course of the future there will be infinitely many good lives (with
value greater than some ε > 0, on some cardinal scale), and infinitely many bad lives (with
value less than −ε < 0). If we were to simply sum up those values, we would have an undefined
total value (or else an infinite one). So we cannot simply sum them up and compare the totals.
Indeed, there is no sensible way to represent such an outcome with a finite real total. So our
aggregative theory must be a bit more sophisticated to compare such outcomes. And we have
various proposals of such theories that are sophisticated enough to still work when our future
contains infinite moral value, e.g., Vallentyne (1993), Vallentyne and Kagan (1997), Lauwers and
Vallentyne (2004), Bostrom (2011), Jonsson and Voorneveld (2018), and Wilkinson (2020) (see
Askell 2018 for a survey). I describe one such method in Section 3. But each of these theories of
aggregation extends our verdicts in finite outcomes to also compare infinite outcomes in a prima
facie plausible manner.
But it turns out that many of those proposed methods of infinite aggregation face serious
problems. As Wilkinson (n.d.) shows, all of those methods which aren’t time-sensitive deliver
absurd verdicts; they cannot judge that any of our actions have an outcome better than any other,
in almost every case we ever face in practice. Along similar lines, Jonsson and Peterson (2020)
show that any such time-insensitive methods must judge lotteries over outcomes in implausible
ways - for instance, a lottery in which every person in the universe has probability 0.9 of value 1
(and value 0 otherwise) cannot be any better than a lottery in which every person has probability
0.1 of value 1 (and value 0 otherwise). So aggregative theories that are time-insensitive are
3This is implied by both the constant cosmological constant model (Wald, 1983; Carroll, 2017) and the
inflationary view (Garriga & Vilenkin, 2001), each of which is widely accepted among physicists and well-
supported by the current body of evidence. Each predicts that our physical universe will be infinite in either
spatial volume or temporal duration. They also each predict that the local events across an infinite sub-region of
our universe will consist of statistical fluctuations from a cold, high-entropy state - so will be effectively random.
And among infinitely many such small-scale regions, we should expect every physically possible state to arise
infinitely many times. So take any small-scale phenomenon you might think is morally valuable e.g., a human
brain processing a sensation of intense pleasure. Over our universe with its infinite volume, we should expect
identical such brains to arise infinitely many times (see Carroll 2017 and Davenport & Olum 2010 for further
detail).
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implausible. There is no such theory that delivers plausible verdicts in the infinite setting.
The only plausible aggregative theories are those which are time-sensitive. (One such theory is
described in Section 3.)
As we will see below in Section 4, this means that our most plausible aggregative theories
face problems to do with relativity, similar to that described above. Like temporal discounting
and like Temkin’s distributive view, these aggregative theories must again struggle to evaluate
outcomes, as fast-moving observers will often disagree on the the temporal order of events - the
same temporal order on which those theories must rely to make judgements.
This problem has been pointed out before, by Cain (1995) and Arntzenius (2014). And
several solutions have been proposed (ibid.). But none of these solutions are satisfactory, as
shown in Section 5 below. In this paper, I develop a new solution using tools from physics,
which avoids the problems of the previous ones (see Section 6) and which also succeeds in a the
setting of general relativity (see Section 7).
In short, the relativity of time poses a serious problem for all aggregative moral theories,
not just theories which are overtly time-sensitive. And, without a solution to this problem, we
would have a compelling reason to abandon aggregative theories entirely and adopt some rival
theory - perhaps pure Kantianism, or some divine command theory. I hope to show here that
aggregationists need not give up just yet, that the problem can be solved, and that we can indeed
make moral judgements based on what will promote the good.
2 Preliminaries
We want to compare outcomes, or worlds. To do so, we want an ‘at least as good as’ relation <
on the set of all possible4 worlds W. This relation < will be a binary relation: it compares two
worlds. It will be reflexive: each world must be at least as good as itself. It will be transitive:
if a world Wa is at least as good as Wb, and Wb is at least as good as Wc, then Wa is at least
as good as Wc. And it will have an asymmetric component () which holds between worlds of
which the first is strictly better, as well as a symmetric component (') which holds between
worlds which are equally good.
The goal is an aggregative theory of value. So whether < holds between any two worlds
must be determined by the total aggregate in each - some impartial5 combination of the values
4Possible in what sense? This could be the set of all epistemically possible worlds, or metaphysically possible
worlds, or logically possible worlds. What follows can be read in terms of any of these.
5Impartiality here can be interpreted in any of several senses: 1) that < must be a qualitative relation; 2)
that < must be a qualitative internal relation, and so entirely independent of the identities of which persons
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of every individual valuable event. Each such event occupies some position in space and time,
so we can associate each such event with a discrete spacetime point.6 For example, for the event
of a human stubbing their toe, we might associate the time and place of the stubbing with the
event. Or we might treat an entire human life as a single event, associated with the time and
place of their birth, or the midpoint of all positions they ever occupy. However we select that
point and however fine-grained we make each event - and nothing below hangs on how we do so
- each valuable event will be associated with some point x in spacetime.
Conversely, we can associate each point in spacetime with some amount of moral value: the
value of the event/s associated with it. For any world Wa, there is a corresponding value function
Va which maps each spacetime point to some real number, a cardinal representation of the moral
value at that point.7 Where there is no valuable event at x, we can let Va(x) be 0, or indeed
any finite constant - in what follows, it will not matter what number we assign to those points
as long as it is consistent.
When comparing some worlds Wa and Wb, it will be helpful to first compare Va(x) to Vb(x)
- to compare the value at the same point across different worlds. But how do we identify that
same point (or, if you prefer, its counterpart) across worlds?8 First, note that all worlds we ever
need to compare in practice will share at least some of the same events - all of those which occur
in our causal past9, since we necessarily cannot change the past. Given this, it is natural to
associate those events with the ‘same’ points in both worlds. And we can extend this mapping
of points from one world to the other by keeping consistent the position of each point relative
to those past points which they have in common (Wilkinson 2020). This will (usually)10 allow
who obtain value; 3) that, in addition to (1) and (2), < must be invariant under any changes in some chosen
class of qualitative properties of the persons obtaining value (e.g., their positions in space and time). I take <
as a qualitative internal relation but not independent of where persons are positioned in space and time. For
discussion of whether this fails to be impartial, see Wilkinson (2020: §3; n.d.: §3).
6Alternatively, we could associate each event with a dense region of points. This is compatible with what
follows, so long as we replace the value function Vi(x) with a value density function vi(x) and sum value over a
region using a (Lebesgue) integral rather than a discrete sum.
7This means that the representation is unique at least up to affine transformations. I leave open the possibilities
that these values can be represented in even greater detail, such as on a ratio scale or translation scale.
8Note that this does not rely on a particular view on whether such points have essential properties (as under
spacetime substantivalism), or whether points are merely artefacts of the relational properties of physical events.
Nor does it require a particular view on whether such points are identical across worlds or merely counterparts.
For claims such as “More value arises at this point in this world than in that world”, we need not interpret them
literally. We might instead interpret that claim as “This event in this world is more valuable than this event in
this other world, where the two events have analogous relational properties to other events, and that match in
relational properties connects the two events for the purposes of moral evaluation (even if they are not genuinely
the same events, or counterparts).”
9Despite the relativistic nature of spacetime, there are at least some points that we’ll observe as occurring in
our past no matter our velocity - those that fall in our past lightcone. That is our causal past.
10This counterpart relation will sometimes give too many or too few counterparts for particular points when
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us to specify, for each point in one world, a unique spacetime point to map it to in the other
world. And those points specified will be the same across worlds in the same sense as we would
typically say (e.g., “1 metre in front of me, at 1 second in the future”).
3 Expansionism
Here, I will describe one plausible method of aggregation which extends our judgements from
the finite setting to also compare infinite worlds in a sensible manner. By way of example, the
method of expansionism goes like this.
Take two worlds, such as Wrecurring and Wonce below, displayed on spacetime diagrams with
matching coordinates.11 Both worlds contain infinitely many valuable events - perhaps each
is an individual person living a happy life. In Wrecurring, there is a happy life being lived at
each grid-point in space and time, except for all points at one particular time. At time t = 0,
Wrecurring skips a generation of happy lives. Meanwhile, Wonce also contains a happy life at each
grid-point in space, but only at the one time, t = 0. At all other times, Wonce is devoid of value.
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
x
t
Figure 1: Wrecurring
1 1 1 1 1
x
t
Figure 2: Wonce
How might we compare the total value of these worlds? If we were to simply sum up the
value in each, we could not say either is better - both contain infinitely many happy lives, so
both sums would approach positive infinity. Simply summing the individual values would not
allow us to say that either outcome is better.
But we might instead sum up the value in each world in a particular order, and consider their
cumulative sum as we go. For instance, start at the point p, as illustrated below. And sum the
our outcomes differ significantly in their spatiotemporal structure. More on this in Section 7.
11This example is adapted from Vallentyne and Kagan (1997: 15).
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values in each world based on how far those valuable events are from p on the diagram. Those
events lying on the radius of length 1 from p get counted before those on the radius of length
2, and so on. We sum value moving outwards from p, effectively expanding the circular region
around p again and again, letting the radius approach infinity.
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
p
x
t
Figure 3: Wrecurring
1 1 1 1 1
p
x
t
Figure 4: Wonce
Summing in this order, we obtain a cumulative sum of the value within radius r of p, for
each real r. For each world, those cumulative sums look like this.
2
4
6
8
10
12
r′
Wrecurring
Wonce
r
∑
{x | d(x,p)≤r}
Vi(x)
Figure 5: Cumulative sums in Wrecurring and Wonce, with expansions starting from p
On this graph, a clear difference appears between the two worlds. Even though these worlds
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might be said to have equivalent total sums of value - both have sums approaching positive
infinity - it can also be said that Wrecurring’s sum approaches infinity a lot faster. Summing over
uniformly-expanding regions of space and time, the cumulative sum of value in Wrecurring rises
far more rapidly than that of Wonce. And, for any sufficiently large circular region centred at p,
Wrecurring will have a far greater cumulative sum. Indeed, for these two worlds, we can replace
p with any point and a sufficiently large circular region around it will contain more value in
Wrecurring than in Wonce. This is because value is far more densely packed into Wrecurring; in an
important sense, there is more of it there. And so we might claim that Wrecurring is better than
Wonce.
Put more precisely, that method for saying that Wrecurring is better is Spatiotemporal Ex-
pansionism (or SE), which is adapted from Wilkinson (2020: 19-20) and Vallentyne and Kagan
(1997: 17).12
SE : For worlds Wa and Wb with the same spacetime points, Wa  Wb if, for all
starting points p, there exists r′ ∈ R such that for all r > r′,∑
{x | d(x,p)≤r}
Va(x)− Vb(x) > 0
And Wa 'Wb if, for all p and all r > r′ the sum equals 0.
As illustrated above, this rule says the following. Take any starting point p. For each world,
take the sum of all value within distance r′ of p. Take the difference between the sums for the
two worlds. Is one greater, such that the difference between them is greater than 0? Will it
still be greater if you expand the distance to some even greater distance r? And will the same
hold for any p you choose? If so, you can say that one world is strictly better. If instead the
difference is precisely 0, for all large r, then the worlds are equally good.
12Wilkinson (2020) demonstrates several problems for this particular method, proposing that we instead adopt
the slightly stronger SE2.
SE2 : Let Wa and Wb be worlds with the same spacetime points. For any starting point p, let
{r1, r2, r3, ...} be the strictly increasing sequence of distances between p and each x such that
Va(x)− Vb(x) 6= 0.
Then Wa Wb if the following sum diverges unconditionally to +∞.
lim
r→∞
r∑
i=1
(ri+1 − ri)
( ∑
{x | d(x,p)≤r}
Va(x)− Vb(x)
)
And Wa 'Wb if the sum is bounded both above and below.
The problems and solutions described below apply in precisely the same way to both Spatiotemporal Expan-
sionism and SE2. Given that the former is much simpler, I will focus on it.
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Note that here the measure of distance d(x,p) between two points x and p is distance in the
standard Euclidean sense: d2 = ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2 + ∆t2 (where ∆x,∆y, and ∆z are differences
in spatial coordinates along three dimensions and ∆t is the difference in time)13 or, when ∆y and
∆z are 0 as in all of my examples, d2 = ∆x2 + ∆t2. This corresponds to the distance obtained
by placing a ruler on the page in the above diagrams. And this needs to be our distance metric
for us to obtain the nice, bounded, circular regions we saw above.14
With SE in hand, we seem to have a plausible method for comparing infinite worlds. It dealt
neatly with the worlds Wrecurring and Wonce in the example above, even though both contained
infinitely many valuable events. And it happens to satisfy a variety of desirable conditions. For
one, it delivers a < relation which is reflexive and transitive. For two, it aggregates value over
different points in an impartial manner, in that no point (and no person) is favoured over another
- indeed, we could swap the value at one point with the value at any other, and SE would confirm
that the world remains equally good.15 So, even though the positioning of value in spacetime
helps to compare worlds under SE, we need not discount nor ignore value based on its position
(see Wilkinson 2020: 12-15; contra Koopmans 1972).
4 Problems
But SE faces serious problems, as do other time-sensitive methods of aggregation. Much like the
views mentioned at the beginning, SE relies on a simplistic understanding of time. It assumes
an absolute and objective distance metric for spacetime, but our spacetime does not have one.
And it invokes regions based on that metric which we know, in our spacetime, also cannot be
absolute and objective.
Note that, in what follows, I demonstrate these problems for SE specifically. But analogous
problems emerge, and can be demonstrated with similar examples, for the proposals of Vallentyne
(1993), Bostrom (2011: 16), Arntzenius (2014: 56), and Jonsson and Voorneveld (2018), as well
13We typically use different units for spatial distance (e.g., metres) and time (e.g., seconds), so a key question
here is how to weigh units of one against units of the other when summing ∆x2 and ∆t2. We could select any
weighting we like but, fortunately, all possible weightings produce the same results in the examples below. (See
the next footnote.) For simplicity of notation in the following sections, I will be weighing the two quantities such
that 1 metre is equivalent to 1
c
seconds, where c is the speed of light in a vacuum in metres per second.
14We might instead adopt any distance metric which satisfies dp = |∆x
a
|p + |∆y
a
|p + |∆z
a
|p + |∆t
b
|p, for some
real p, a, b. But alternative values of p, a, and b would give us regions of more arbitrary shape. And they wouldn’t
make any difference to problems we encounter in the next section so, for brevity’s sake, I will ignore them (see
ibid.: 19 for further discussion).
15This result corresponds to the condition of Finite Anonymity (over points in time and space) which is a
common desideratum in the literature on infinite aggregation (e.g., Lauwers 2010).
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as for temporal discounting (Arrow 1999) and the temporal distribution view (Temkin 2015)
from the introduction.
4.1 Galilean relativity
These problems emerge even without Einsteinian relativity. Consider a seemingly straightforward
case. Suppose there will exist a infinitely long-lived civilisation which produces constant amounts
of moral value at regular intervals of time. You can either 1) leave that civilisation at a fixed
spatial position, producing world Wstationary; or set the civilisation moving at some moderate
(perhaps very slow) speed relative to yourself, producing Wmoving. The same values will occur
at the same times whether or not you set the civilisation in motion, and your choice will not
alter any other events.
Figure 6 represents the difference between the two worlds. Since the verdicts of SE depend
only on the differences between the two worlds being compared, we can combine the two worlds
into one: we can construct Wmoving −Wstationary giving the difference in value between worlds
at each spacetime point (i.e., with value function Vm−s(x) = Vmoving(x) − Vstationary(x)); and
Wmoving will be at least as good as Wstationary if and only if Wmoving −Wstationary is at least as
good as a world with value 0 at every point. This world of differences will have negative values
where the civilisation would have been left in place in Wstationary, and positive values at the
positions it occupies while in motion in Wmoving.
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
p
x
t
Figure 6: Wmoving −Wstationary
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But, if we apply SE, it turns out that this world is worse than the world of zero value; and
so Wmoving is worse than Wstationary. To see why, expand from starting point p; and (naively)
use the distance metric d based on the coordinate representation in Figure 6. The cumulative
sums we obtain are as plotted below. As you can see, they quickly fall below 0, and will remain
there indefinitely as r approaches positive infinity.
−4
−2
reqn
Figure 7: Cumulative sum of Wmoving −Wstationary, with expansions starting from p
The same holds no matter which starting point we choose. So it seems that SE judges
Wstationary as better than Wmoving. And this verdict is strange. The only change from the
former world to the latter is setting (some of) its inhabitants in motion. They all still live and
obtain moral value at the exact same times, but at different spatial positions. It is odd that this
could make a moral difference; that events in the life of a person (or civilisation) in motion can
effectively be worth less than if they remained at rest.
But this case produces even greater strangeness if we recognise the Galilean principle of
relativity: roughly that, under the laws of Newtonian mechanics, an observer cannot distinguish
any particular velocity as being at rest, by any mechanical experiment they perform. So any
observer travelling at constant velocity might as well be treated as at rest; the observer may well
think they are. So, in our comparison of the civilisation at rest and the civilisation in motion,
there is a symmetry between the two outcomes - in each, the resulting civilisation may consider
themselves at rest, and that it’s the inhabitants of the other outcome who would have been in
motion.
Suppose the civilisation’s inhabitants in Wmoving consider themselves at rest. As far as they
can tell, they would be. Then, from their perspective, the comparison we performed above would
look like this.
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-1
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x
t
Figure 8: Wmoving −Wstationary, with the regions centred on p as above, but plotted in a coor-
dinate system under which the velocity of the inhabitants of Wmoving is treated as at rest.
Those regions around p now look awfully arbitrary. To the inhabitants of Wmoving, they don’t
look like circles of fixed distance around p; instead they are these strange skewed ellipses. Were
the inhabitants of Wmoving to compare the worlds themselves, and treated their own velocity as
the one at absolute rest and measuring distance accordingly, they would draw those regions quite
differently (as circles rather than ellipses in Figure 8). And, applying SE using those regions,
they would reach the opposite verdict: that Wmoving is the better outcome.
So we have a serious problem. The distance measure d, the regions of fixed distance around
a given p and, it seems, the verdicts of SE all depend on which velocity counts as being at
absolute rest. In Figure 6, I assumed that it was the velocity of the inhabitants of Wstationary.
But the inhabitants themselves may not know that - there’s no mechanical experiment they
could perform that would distinguish their own velocity as any more ‘at rest’ than any other.
Indeed, modern physics now tells us that there is no experiment at all which would distinguish
one velocity over another (Einstein 1905) - there is no non-arbitrary way to say what counts
as absolute rest. So we have no reason to think there is any such thing. And what does this
mean for SE? Depending on our interpretation of d, it means either: there simply is no distance
metric d, and so SE gives no verdicts at all; or else d is relative to the perspective of the agent
(or perhaps the observer), and so the verdicts of SE are relative too. But our moral judgements
must be absolute, not relative to perspective, so the latter interpretation is implausible. And so
SE gives no verdicts at all - we have no absolute distance measure, we cannot construct absolute
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regions of distance d around a point, and so we cannot give absolute judgements. It seems we
must abandon SE.
4.2 Special relativity
Although this problem arises with just Galilean relativity, that isn’t the full story. Our under-
standing of space and time did not stop with Galilean relativity and Newtonian mechanics. We
now know that observers at different velocities disagree about much more than what counts as
at rest; they also disagree about measurements of spatial distance, about measurements of time,
and even about whether two given events are simultaneous. Their perspectives differ far more
than they would under Galilean relativity (and, surprisingly, this greater difference will help
later in developing solutions).
To see such a disagreement in action, consider a pair of worlds analogous to before: in
Wstationary, a civilisation stays ‘at rest’ and produces moral value at regular intervals; and, in
W ′moving, that civilisation is instead set in motion. (On this diagram, its relative speed would be
4
5 of the speed of light, but the same result arises even if the difference in velocity is minuscule.)
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
p
x
t
Figure 9: W ′moving −Wstationary
In both outcomes, the inhabitants of the civilisation produce one unit of value for each one
unit of time, according to their own experience of time. But, as you can see in Figure 9, they
will not agree that the inhabitants of the other outcome would produce value as quickly as they
do. The above figure treats the inhabitants of Wstationary as at rest and, from their perspective,
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those valuable events that would occur in W ′moving are spaced further apart in time; in the time
it takes Wstationary to produce three units of value, W
′
moving appears to produce only one. In
fact, the inhabitants of W ′moving would observe the exact reverse, that Wstationary produces value
more slowly!
This is due to time dilation, a phenomenon implied by Einstein’s special theory of relativity
(Cohn 1904). If one observer watches t seconds tick by on their own wristwatch, any observer
moving at speed v (as a fraction of the speed of light) relative to them will see that same ticking
take t′ seconds, where t′ = t√
1−v2 .
Since no velocity is any more at rest than another, the reverse holds as well: the first observer
will also see the ‘moving’ observer’s wristwatch tick more slowly. So of course the inhabitants of
W ′moving and Wstationary will disagree about which outcome produces value more quickly. And,
so too, they will disagree about which events in their own outcome would be simultaneous with
which events in the other: an inhabitant of Wstationary will observe the first valuable event in
Wstationary occurring before the first such event would occur in W
′
moving; an inhabitant of W
′
moving
will observe the reverse. Like duration, there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity.
Suppose we try to apply SE again. If we were to (naively) apply the distance measure d as
defined earlier, based on the perspective of Wstationary’s inhabitants, we would obtain the regions
around p plotted in Figure 9 above: a sequence of nice concentric circles. But if we then switch
to the perspective of W ′moving, those regions would appear as below - with an even greater skew
than last time.
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Figure 10: W ′moving−Wstationary, with regions centred on p as above, but plotted in a coordinate
system under which the velocity of the inhabitants of W ′moving is treated as at rest.
As before, those regions around p now look awfully arbitrary. And again, if the inhabitants
of W ′moving were to draw the regions of fixed distance d from their own perspective, they would
do so very differently. This is because the distance d they would measure between any two
(non-identical) points x and p will be different. The measure d, taken in this manner, is not
absolute; it is relative to the velocity at which the measurement is taken.
But the deeper problem is this: the definition d2 = ∆x2+∆t2 makes no mention of perspective
or velocity; instead, it was implicitly assumed that there were some such absolute quantities ∆t
and ∆x. But there aren’t. Any measurements of time or spatial distance will be relative to the
velocity of the observer measuring them, by special relativity. So we have no measure d with
which to construct regions of fixed distance, we have no such regions, and so we have no verdicts
at all from SE. The principle is silent in all cases.
But we might modify the definition of d, and of SE, ever so slightly to still deliver some
judgements. Here is one way we might do that. Define the measures ∆t and ∆x as quantities
relative to the velocity of the agent making the moral comparison. Then d will be relative
to their velocity too. And, so too, SE’s verdict will be relative - in the case above, an agent
travelling at the velocity of W ′moving’s inhabitants would judge W
′
moving is better than Wstationary,
and an agent travelling at the velocity of Wstationary’s inhabitants would say judge Wstationary
as better. And both are right, since SE’s verdicts are relative to the velocity of the judge. But
this is absurd. An agent in motion could judge the outcomes one way, while an agent at rest
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could judge the outcomes in a contradictory way, even when the outcomes are identical in each
case? Or, alternatively, an agent could change which verdict is correct in an upcoming decision
by simply moving faster? Moral ‘relativism’ of this kind is implausible, especially when we are
seeking to compare outcomes impartially, as is a basic motivation of aggregative moral theories.
And this relativism is all the more implausible given that these verdicts can change based on
arbitrarily small differences in velocity - the same phenomena arises in the case above when the
civilisations in W ′moving and Wstationary differ by any non-zero velocity. So this modification is a
non-starter.
Here is an alternative one. Again, let the metric d be relative to the velocity of the agent
comparing two outcomes. But, for SE to make a judgement, don’t just require that all starting
points p deliver the same verdict. Also require that all measurements of d deliver the same
verdict. The agent must produce the same ranking of the worlds regardless of their velocity.
Otherwise, let SE remain silent: the two worlds under consideration are simply incomparable.
But this approach is implausible too. The example above was a fairly mundane one: for some
infinite sequence of value, either leave it be or set it (ever so slightly) in motion. If a method of
aggregation cannot compare these two outcomes, it seems seriously inadequate. And so, again,
it seems we must abandon SE.
5 Existing solutions
This relativistic problem may seem fatal to the expansionist approach. SE, and its nearby
modifications, are either universally silent or otherwise implausible. So must we abandon it
entirely, and moral aggregation along with it? I hope not. Here are two other proposals of how
we might salvage it, both from Arntzenius (2014). Unfortunately, each of these faces serious
problems as well.
5.1 Double lightcones
Here is one suggested solution, described by Arntzenius (ibid.: 44) and credited to Cian Dorr.
In the definition of SE, forget about any distance measure d. All we need is a sequence of
expanding regions of spacetime, each neatly bounded and each containing all of the regions that
came before it. And, to overcome the relativistic problem, we need that sequence of regions to
not vary with the perspective of the observer.
Under special relativity, we can obtain such regions as follows. Select two spacetime points,
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one earlier in time than the other according to all observers - perhaps two points with the
same spatial position, as illustrated below. For the earlier point, draw its future lightcone: the
region of points you could reach if at that point you emitted particles travelling at or below
the speed of light in any direction. And, for the later point, draw its past lightcone: the region
of points from which you could emit such particles and have them reach the later point. The
intersection of those two regions - their ‘double lightcone’ - forms a diamond-shaped region with
both endpoints as vertices. Repeat this process with additional pairs of points to obtain your
sequence of expanding regions. One such sequence of regions is illustrated below, expanding
around p, applied to the same example of W ′moving versus Wstationary from above.
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
p
x
t
Figure 11: W ′moving −Wstationary with a sequence of double lightcones around p
We can apply a modified version of SE with this sequence of regions instead of the expanding
circles of fixed radius. If we did, we would sum the −1s faster than the +1s, and so our cumulative
sum would approach −∞. We would be led to the verdict that W ′moving is worse than Wstationary.
But is this verdict absolute, no matter the observer’s velocity?
It is true that these regions would be constructed the same way by observers moving at any
velocity, as long as those observers use the same pairs of endpoints to construct them. But
the challenge lies in selecting those pairs of endpoints in the first place. To get a sense of why
different observers or agents might disagree about which endpoints - and hence which double
lightcones - to use, consider that same sequence of regions from the perspective of an observer
moving at the same velocity as the inhabitants of W ′moving.
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Figure 12: W ′moving −Wstationary with the same sequence of double lightcones, viewed from the
perspective of the inhabitants of W ′moving
Much like in the previous section, these regions now look awfully arbitrary. And we could
easily construct very different ones. For instance, suppose we followed the same method as above
and selecting endpoints at the same spatial position as p, but did so from the perspective of
W ′moving. We would generate very different regions which, from the perspective of W
′
moving, would
have the same nice diamond shape as we saw in Figure 11 (and the same strange rectangles as
in Figure 12 if we switched back to the previous perspective). But this would give us a different
verdict: summing over such a sequence of regions we would sum the +1s much faster than the
−1s; our cumulative sum would approach +∞; and so we would conclude that W ′moving is better
than Wstationary.
In short, there is no non-arbitrary way to select the endpoints from which we construct the
sequence of double lightcones.16 Simply placing them at some particular position relative to
your starting point p (e.g., at the same spatial position at an earlier/later time) will always
result in different regions for agents travelling at different velocities. And different selections can
deliver different verdicts, as demonstrated above. So this solution does not succeed; the problem
remains.
16One way we might try to select those endpoints without arbitrariness is to set them at the positions of the
valuable events in each world - at the +1s and −1s in the diagram. But setting each of those points as the later
endpoint of a double lightcone will produce regions which overlap only partially and so do not form a sequence
of expanding regions.
18
5.2 The spacetime metric
Here is another suggested solution, also from Arntzenius (ibid.: 43).
In the definition of SE, simply replace the distance measure d with a better measure of 4-
dimensional distance: one that is invariant across changes in velocity. In the most basic spacetime
of special relativity we have one such metric - the spacetime metric s - which is defined as follows.
s2 = ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2 −∆t2
As before, ∆y and ∆z will be 0 in the examples below, so this simplifies to s2 = ∆x2 −∆t2.
But what does s represent, other than some abstract mathematical quantity? In fact, it
measures the ‘proper time’, or ‘proper distance’, between any two points in spacetime. The
proper time between a pair of points is the duration of time we’d record on a clock travelling
from one to the other at constant velocity. (Note that this only exists if you could reach one
from the other by travelling at less than the speed of light.) Meanwhile, the proper distance is
the spatial distance that you’d measure between them if you were travelling at just the right
velocity to see those points as simultaneous. (And this only exists if there is such a velocity - if
neither lies in the other’s future lightcone.)
If we replace d with s in the definition of SE, the regions we generate around p will look like
those in Figure 13 below.17 Each of these hyperbolic regions corresponds to the set of all points
within some constant proper time (or distance) of p. Effectively, each region is the set of points
that you could reach from p within some time |s2| (from your own perspective) by travelling at a
constant speed, or that would look like they were within distance |s2| of p from some perspective.
But recall that time passes more slowly for fast-moving observers, and lengths appear shorter.
So, for two future points which seem to you to lie at the same time, the one further from you
in space would actually be the smaller proper time from your position. Likewise, for two points
which seem to you to lie at the same spatial position but at different times, the one further from
you in time would be the smaller proper distance from you.
17Unlike d, s sometimes takes on imaginary values (whenever ∆t > ∆x). So |s2|, or
√
|s2|, actually serves as
a more fitting replacement for d.
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Figure 13: A sequence of regions each comprised of points within some fixed |s2| of p.
Crucially, the shape of each of these regions will not differ at all between the perspectives of
observers at different velocities. So too, the value of s between any two points will not change.
So any two observers would draw precisely the same regions no matter their velocity. They
would draw specific points in different places, but they would still draw them within precisely
the same regions as one another. So we have an expanding sequence of regions that everyone
can agree on, and over which we can apply SE without controversy.
For instance, in the problem case ofW ′moving versusWstationary from above, we would construct
our regions as below. And as you can see, each −1 and its corresponding +1 lie on the boundary
of the same region - they lie at the same distance from p, according to the spacetime metric,
and this would be the case even if we switched perspectives.
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Figure 14: W ′moving −Wstationary
So, if we applied SE using these regions instead of the circles from earlier, each of those −1s
would cancel out the corresponding +1. Our cumulative sum would be 0 at all times (and, if we
started from a point other than p, it would be 0 for all sufficiently large regions). So we would
judge W ′moving and Wstationary as equally good. And recall that this comparison was between a
world in which a sequence of valuable events were left stationary, and one in which those events
were moving but still occurred at the same frequency (from the perspective of those involved
in the events). As it turns out, we will obtain the same verdict for any such pair of worlds, no
matter their difference in velocity. And that seems like the right verdict; changing the velocity
of your descendants shouldn’t make the world better or worse!
But, as you might guess, this supposed solution faces a serious problem of its own: any
of those regions around p can contain infinite value (or undefined total value). For instance,
consider a comparison of worlds Wright and Wleft which differ according to the diagram below.
Wright contains a sequence of valuable events extending off towards the right, while Wleft contains
a sequence extending off towards the left.
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Figure 15: Wright −Wleft
In Wright −Wleft, every single one of those points with value +1 or −1 lies at s = 0 from p.
Suppose we try to take a cumulative sum, starting from p and summing value in order of its
distance s from p. That cumulative sum will break down immediately: we cannot assign a finite
value on the region with distance 1 of p, or even the region within distance 0.000001 of p; the
sum of value in each region doesn’t converge to any value, nor does it diverge unconditionally
to +∞ or −∞.
So this modified version of SE that uses the spacetime metric s brings us to a position
similar to where we started: we wanted to compare worlds containing infinite value, but standard
addition on the real numbers does not allow us to do so. For the same reason, we cannot compare
worlds like these under this proposal.18 This proposal is inadequate.
18Why not just accept that worlds like this are exotic enough that it is fine if our theory cannot compare them?
The key reason is that I suspect that every comparison we ever need to make, in practice, resembles this case. As
argued in Wilkinson (n.d.), almost every significant moral decision we ever make will affect infinitely many future
persons and an infinite quantity of future value. For some such decision between two acts, let W1 and W2 be the
resulting worlds, and W1 −W2 the world of composed of the differences between them. And suppose we take
some region of spacetime which has an infinite volume lying in our future lightcone (our causal future). Within
that region, we should expect W1 −W2 to contain infinitely much positive value and infinitely much negative
value; the total sum of value in W1 −W2 within that region will be undefined. We face the same problem as
in the case above. So I want a theory which deals with the case above because, without one, we likely cannot
compare the actual outcomes of everyday decisions.
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6 A better solution
That last solution was inadequate, but there is a promising solution in its near vicinity.
As Arntzenius diagnoses it, the problem with the last solution is that each of those regions
we identified have infinite 4-dimensional volume.19 And thanks to this fact and their shape, we
can arrange infinitely many valuable events within each of them, as we say in Figure 15 above.
To avoid this problem, it is sufficient to have a sequence of expanding regions each of which
has only finite 4-dimensional volume (and which observers won’t disagree about). Then each of
those regions will contain only finite value, and we can proceed with our comparisons as before.
But why is finite volume enough to guarantee finite value? I assume - quite plausibly, I think
- that we can only ever fit finite moral value into a finite volume. Certainly on most standard
accounts of what constitutes moral value, we cannot produce infinite value in merely finite space
and time. For instance, a person takes up some finite spatial volume and, to undergo some
extremely valuable experience, they require some duration of time over which to experience it;
so the valuable event requires some non-zero four-dimensional volume. There are ways we can
produce more and more value - we can make that person’s valuable experience last longer, and/or
we can add additional people having valuable experiences of their own - but to do so we must
effectively use up a larger and larger volume of spacetime. You cannot scale up the amount of
value to an infinite quantity without also scaling up the volume of spacetime involved to some
infinite volume; you cannot fit infinite value into finite volume.20
19There are two notions of volume we might use here. The first is the standard Euclidean notion, extended
to four dimensions - a region with constant spatial volume V and duration in time t simply has 4-dimensional
volume V × t. The alternative is ‘Riemannian volume’, which is generated from the metric s. Fortunately, in flat
spacetime, the Riemannian volume of any given region will simply be −1 times its Euclidean volume. So, if one
is finite, so will be the other. And, interestingly, since the Riemannian volume is the same for all observers, so
will be the Euclidean volume.
Sticking with the Euclidean volume, we can calculate the volume within one of thos regions as follows. Take
the region centred on p and containing all points within |s2| = 1 of p - the innermost region in Figure 15 above.
And, for simplicity, adopt a coordinate system such that p = (0, 0, 0, 0) and that the boundary of the region
intersects (1,0,0,0) and (0,0,0,1). Then note that the spatial volume of the region at any t will be 4π
3
∆x3, where
∆x is the total length of the intervals of possible values of x > 0 within the region at that time t. (Equivalently,
∆x is the width of the region at t on the right of p on the graphs above.) We can then obtain the volume by
taking the following integral.
volume =
∫ +∞
−∞
4π
3
∆x3dt
= 2
∫ 1
0
4π
3
√
t2 + 1
3
dt+ 2
∫ +∞
1
4π
3
(√
t2 + 1
3
−
√
t2 − 1
3
)
dt
And that second integral diverges unconditionally to +∞. Likewise for any of the regions bounded by |s2| = k;
simply replace the 1s within the square roots with ks.
20Here is one benign exception. Suppose a person lives for an infinite duration and, during their life, obtains
infinite total value. If we treat their entire life as a single event and associate it with a single point in spacetime,
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But, actually, there is a sufficient condition for making expansionism work which is even
weaker than this. We don’t need our regions to have finite volume; we just need them to have
only a finite portion of their volume lying in the agent’s future lightcone. Recall from earlier
that a point’s future lightcone is the region of all points you could reach by travelling from that
point at or below the speed of light. With few exceptions21, all of the events in the universe that
you or I can affect lie in our future lightcone - to change events anywhere else, we would need
to send a signal faster than the speed of light, or else back in time. So in practice, whenever
an agent chooses between two actions, the outcomes of those actions cannot differ at any points
outside the future lightcone of where and when the agent takes the action. That means that,
at any point x outside the lightcone, the difference in value between the two outcomes will be
Va(x) − Vb(x) = 0. So, going back to our expanding regions, it won’t actually matter if such a
region contains an infinite volume, as long as it only has finite volume within the agent’s future
lightcone. This is enough for any of the pairs of outcomes we ever actually need to compare -
those that arise from the alternative actions of a real-world agent.
With this knowledge in hand, we can solve the problems of the previous section. As before
(and as depicted by the dotted lines below), we can use regions given by the spacetime metric,
each consisting of all points within some fixed distance of |s2| from some central point p. But
suppose that p must be in the agent’s past. Then each region around p will only have finite
volume within the agent’s future lightcone, as we needed.
then any region containing that point will contain infinite value, even if the region has only finite volume. And
so there would be no sequence of expanding regions which could sensibly compare this outcome to another.
This possibility may seem problematic, but the problem is due to the simplicity of how I have so far modelled
the world. We need not treat entire lives as single events; we could instead decompose them into smaller events.
Nor do we need to associate events with discrete points in spacetime. We could instead distribute the value across
the entire densely-packed regions of spacetime that they occupy. Admittedly, this would bring complications. For
instance, the natural way to divide value evenly across infinitely many densely-packed points in a region would be
via a value density function. To sum the value across a dense region, we would then need to take the (Lebesgue)
integral of value density across the region, rather than simply taking a discrete sum. But we can overlook this
complication here - for simplicity, I will stick with examples involving only finite values at discrete points.
21[***fn on ’spooky action at a distance, a la https://www.livescience.com/62523-physicists-crowdsource-a-
reality-check.html
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Figure 16: Wright −Wleft
Suppose we used this sequence of regions to sum the value in Wright−Wleft. The cumulative
sum of value would remain at 0 at every stage - each region contains precisely as many 1s as −1,
so they’ll cancel one another out. Likewise if we start at any starting points in the agent’s past
lightcone and expand out far enough, the events in each sequence all cancel one another out.22
If only every allowable sequence of regions said this, we might be able to say that Wright and
Wleft are equally good.
And they can, if we restrict the allowable sequences of regions to those like this, that contain
only finite value in each region. That brings us to my preferred modification of SE, which I’ll
call Relativistic Spatiotemporal Expansionism (RSE).23
RSE : Let Wa and Wb be any worlds with the same spacetime points and, for any
22Strictly speaking, although each event would be cancelled out by the corresponding even in the other sequence,
the cumulative sum would still deviate from 0 (though for shorter and shorter intervals). So SE would still fail to
say that Wright and Wleft are equally good. But that is no great problem - the strengthened principle SE2 (from
Wilkinson 2020) deals neatly with situations like this and judges the worlds as equally good. (See Footnote 12.)
23This definition of RSE generates an intransitive < relation (see Footnote 31 of Wilkinson 2020). But this is
easily remedied, by modifying RSE in line with Wilkinson’s (ibid.: 30) later proposal (see Footnote 10 above).
To avoid complicating RSE even further, without much gain, I will stick with the simpler definition used here.
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point p and positive real r, let:
S(p, r) =
∑
{x | |s(x,p)2|≤r}
Va(x)− Vb(x)
i) Wa Wb if: for some starting point p and some r′, we have finite S(p, r) > 0 for
all r > r′; and for no starting point q do we have finite S(q, r) ≤ 0 for all r > r′.
ii) Wa 'Wb if: for some starting point p and some r′, S(p, r) = 0 for all r > r′; and
for no starting point q do we have finite S(q, r) ≶ 0 for all r > r′.
Although it seems complex, RSE has us do roughly the same thing as SE: sum the value in
Wa and Wb in order of its distance from p; and, if Wa’s sum takes the lead and stays in the
lead beyond some distance r′, then Wa is better; if instead the sums are equal and stay equal
beyond r′, then the worlds are equally good. The only differences are: we use the distance given
by |s2|, to avoid problems with relativity; and, crucially, we don’t need all starting points p to
agree. To say that Wa is better, it’s enough to have just one starting point p that gives Wa
the winning sum, as long as there is no other starting point q that disagree. Similarly, to say
that the worlds are equally good, it’s enough to have just one point p that says that the sums
become equal, as long as there is no q to disagree.
In the case of Wleft and Wleft in Figure 16 above, we have a starting point p which generates
a sequence of expanding regions over which the differences between worlds sum to 0 no matter
how far we expand. And, as it turns out, there is no starting point that says that the sum is
strictly positive or strictly negative (and finite)24 beyond some distance r′. So RSE judges Wleft
and Wleft as equally good. And, intuitively, so they should be! One world involved sending off
some sequence of value into space in one direction; the other involved sending it off in another,
precisely mirrored, direction at the same speed; so neither world should be any better than the
other.
So RSE delivers a judgement here, and the intuitively plausible one at that. And, since it
uses a distance metric on which all observers can agree, it gives consistent verdicts no matter
the velocity we are travelling at while comparing outcomes. The problem is solved.
24There are some points we might choose that give an infinite value at every single stage of the sum: those
precisely in line with either of the two sequences of value (but not both). This is why RSE specifies that starting
points are only allowable if they give finite sums.
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7 General relativity
The basic problem I have considered is that, once we considered the implications of the special
theory of relativity, SE delivered verdicts very different from what we anticipated (or else no
verdicts at all). So it is natural to ask at this point: what happens to this new aggregation
method, RSE, if we consider the implications of the general theory of relativity?
Under special relativity alone, spacetime is flat : objects not subject to any force travel
in straight lines, which respect some basic properties of Euclidean geometry; if those paths
are parallel at some stage, they will never meet; if orthogonal, they will only ever meet once.
But under general relativity, depending on the matter and radiation present, spacetime may
be curved : those same objects may follow curved paths which are parallel (or orthogonal) at
some stage but still meet eventually (or again). This curvature corresponds to what we might
otherwise think of as a gravitational ‘field’ - massive objects appear to accelerate towards one
another. But, given the discrepancies we observe in measuring distance and time (e.g., Hafele &
Keating 1972), we know that this is not due simply to a field of force; it is due to curvature of
spacetime itself.
In particular, in a curved spacetime, the metric s from will no longer apply universally. Over
small enough regions, it will often still deliver measurements which approximate proper time
and proper distance. But over larger regions it will not, and so different observers will measure
different values of s. So we have a problem: when spacetime is curved, RSE as defined above
will fail to deliver verdicts on which all observers will agree.
But this problem is easily solved. Every curved spacetime we encounter will have a close
analogue of s, often simply called its metric, or g. This metric depends on the distribution of
matter and radiation across spacetime. And so the measurements it produces between two points
may depend on the absolute position of those points. But this is fitting, since the proper times
(or proper distances) between those points depend on curvature, and so on absolute position, as
well.
Here is one example of a metric for a curved spacetime. Suppose that spacetime contains
just one massive object25, which approximates the shape of spacetime close to the Earth or to
our sun. This is called a Schwarzchild spacetime, and has the associated Schwarzchild metric g
given by the following complicated-looking equation (Schwarzchild 1916).
g =
r
r − k
dr2 + r2dθ2 + r2 sin2 θdφ2 − (1− k
r
)dt2
25By assumption, this body has no electric charge nor angular momentum, and the cosmological constant is 0.
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For readers who are curious, g is given in polar spherical coordinates, with r our distance
from the centre of the object, θ and φ our polar coordinates on the sphere at that radius r, t
the position in time, and k a positive constant determined by the object’s mass. And we have
g defined in terms of dr, dt, and so on. Why not ∆r,∆t, and so on? Since the curvature varies
from across spacetime, so will the equation for g from point to point. What this equation gives
us, for each point x, is the rate of change of the distance measure at x. To actually obtain the
distance measure between two points, we need to take the integral of g along a straight path
between the two points, and then we need to choose the lowest value given by all of those paths
- call it g′.
Equations aside, this is what that metric actually looks like (holding θ and φ fixed). The
massive object is positioned at r = 0. And around the point p we have the regions of points
within various fixed distances g′. There is also an agent placed slightly in the future of p, just
to show how their future lightcone intersects with those regions.
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t
Figure 17: A sequence of regions each comprised of points within some fixed g′ of p.
Much as we did with other regions in flat spacetime, we can use this sequence of regions
to apply RSE in curved spacetime. The sequences of expanding regions generated by distance
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measure g′ are very similar to those generated by s, just skewed a bit by gravitational curvature
- they bend towards t = ±∞ as r approaches 0 and we get closer to the massive body. And when
we place a lightcone starting just a little later than the central point p, as we can see here, only
a finite portion of that lightcone will lie within each region (since the lightcone skews just as the
regions do). So, with the right choice of p, these regions will each only contain finite value, as we
need them to. On top of that, these regions will be constructed the same way by all observers,
regardless of their velocity, since g′ is a distance measure independent of the observer’s velocity
(as it measures proper time and proper distance). And so, by simply switching our distance
metric from |s2| to g′, it seems that we can easily modify RSE to work in curved spacetime.
But will this always work? Sure, we will always have a distance metric g′ on which all
observers can agree. But will we always be able to choose a point p such that only a finite
volume of each region will fall in the agent’s future lightcone?
Yes, as it turns out. The Schwarzchild spacetime above approximates spacetime in the
vicinity of just about any massive body. And a universe containing many such bodies would
simply have the warping of spacetime that occurs around such a body (illustrated on the left
side of Figure 17) happen at lots of different positions. But that warping didn’t stop us from
having only a finite volume of each region overlap with the agent’s future lightcone; nor would
having that same warping occur elsewhere stop us either. And other realistic spacetimes appear
to not stop us either. Whether we face a spacetime under which the universe is expanding
or contracting (e.g., a Friedmann-Lemâıtre-Robertson-Walker spacetime), or in which massive
bodies are rotating (as approximated by, e.g., Kerr spacetime) or have charge (as approximated
by, e.g., a Reissner-Nördstrom spacetime), or even in which entropy is so great that curvature
is approximately constant (e.g., a de Sitter or anti-de Sitter spacetime), we will still have only
a finite overlap between those regions.26 No matter which of the many plausible spacetimes our
future might resemble, it seems that (a slightly modified form of) RSE will still be able to deliver
comparisons.
Before I wrap up, there is a further problem that arises for aggregation under general rel-
ativity. Recall the method I suggested in Section 2 for identifying the ‘same’ (or counterpart)
spacetime points across worlds: first we identify all of the events outside the agent’s future light-
cone with the same points in each outcome, since these events will be fixed no matter what the
agent does; then we map each of the points within the future lightcone to whichever points have
matching distances in space and time from all of those points outside the lightcone. But, from
the last four sections, it is abundantly clear that this relation won’t work - there are no abso-
lute distances between points, in space and in time, that do not differ with the velocity of the
26A full discussion of each of these is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would refer interested readers to
Carroll (2004) for technical descriptions of each of these forms of spacetime.
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observer. So we must reformulate the relation: instead, perhaps, we replace “distances in space
and time” with “distances according to the spacetime metric s (or, in curved spacetime, g′)”;
we map each future point x to whichever of the points in other worlds have matching distance
|s(x,p)| from every point p outside the future lightcone (or, in curved spacetime, whichever
points have matching distance g′ between them). All observers can agree on these measures of
distance, so all observers can agree on which points are the same (or counterparts) under this
relation.
But this relation still has trouble with general relativity. Curved spacetime works very
differently from Euclidean space, and differently even from flat spacetime - we may have a point
x that is such and such distance (given by g′) from each of several other points, but if we changed
the curvature of spacetime then it might be that multiple points are such and such distance from
each of those several other points, or it might be that no points are! So it is conceivable that the
above counterpart / transworld identity relation will sometimes say that a point x in the agent’s
future lightcone in one world is the same as (or counterpart to) multiple points in another world,
or no points. Thus, whenever we compare worlds in which the agent’s action produces just the
right changes in how matter and radiation are distributed, and so how spacetime is curved, our
relation for saying which points are which breaks down.
This may seem problematic for RSE, but it isn’t really. Which spacetime points are the same
and which aren’t enters into the definition of RSE in two places. The first: we need to be able to
start our expansions at the same point p in each world. But we can do this even with our wonky
relation - simply pick a point p outside the agent’s future lightcone, which will always have a
unique identity/counterpart across the worlds under comparison. The second: for each point
x, we want to identify the same point (or its counterpart) across worlds to take the difference
in value at that point, which we will then sum up over all such points within each region. But
nothing much hangs on whether some value lies at x or at another point in the region; we really
just need the (difference in) value across the whole region. So we can avoid any problem here
by simply assigning Va(x) = 0 whenever x is absent from world Wa; and, when x has multiple
identities/counterparts in Wa, simply let Va be the sum of their values. This allows us to sum
the differences in value across each region without needing to worry whether each point has a
unique identity/counterpoint in every world. RSE works just fine despite this.
8 Conclusion
Above, we saw a potentially devastating problem for aggregative moral theories: thanks to
special relativity, many such theories either cannot compare any outcomes at all, or else they
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must allow their comparisons to be dependent on the velocity of whoever is doing the comparing.
Why? To make any plausible judgements in the infinite setting, aggregative theories must
utilise the positioning of value in space and time (Wilkinson 2020; Jonsson & Peterson 2020;
Wilkinson n.d.). But the way this positioning is used often presupposes characteristics of space
and time that we now know are simply not accurate. For example, in Section 3, we saw that
to evaluate outcomes using the standard version of ‘expansionist’ approach (from Vallentyne &
Kagan 1997; Arntzenius 2014; Wilkinson 2020), we need standard Euclidean distance over four
dimensions to be absolute and observer-independent. But it isn’t. So that approach cannot
make any judgements at all. Even on a charitable reading, by which we let that measure depend
on the velocity of the observer, this approach leads to an absurd form of moral relativism - the
correct judgement may differ if you just travel fast enough.
Similar problems can be demonstrated for other theories - the proposals of Vallentyne (1993),
Bostrom (2011: 16), and Jonsson & Voorneveld (2018) all face analogous problems, arising in
analogous cases. And other time-sensitive theories of value - temporal discounting as endorsed
by Arrow (1999), and Temkin’s (2015) temporal distribution view - face them too. And so it
seems we must reject all such theories; it seems we must reject moral aggregation entirely.
In this paper, I have demonstrated that this problem can be overcome. With careful consider-
ation of the geometry of spacetime, we can modify aggregative theories to still deliver judgements.
We can still compare outcomes based on their total aggregate of value, even in a universe as
peculiar as ours.27
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